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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
Elinor H. Hitt**
Andrew B. McClintock***
and Allison C. Kessler****
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses significant case law and legislative updates to
Georgia domestic relations law that arose during the survey period from
June 1, 2018 through May 31, 2019.1
II. CONTRACT RULES
A series of amendments to O.C.G.A. §§ 19-3-60 through 662 went into
effect during the survey period. Effective July 1, 2018, the amendments
statutorily define “antenuptial agreement”3 and require that such
agreements be “in writing, signed by both parties who agree to be
bound, and attested by at least two witnesses, one of whom shall be a
notary public.”4 However, the statute provides “[a]ntenuptial
agreements shall be liberally construed to carry into effect the intention
*Partner, Warner Bates. University of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University
of California (LL.B., 1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Partner, Warner Bates. University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993); Georgia State
University (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***Associate, Warner Bates. University of Georgia (B.A., 2012); University of Georgia
(J.D., 2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
****Associate, Warner Bates. University of Georgia (B.S., B.A., 2011); Georgia State
University (J.D., 2018). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia domestic relations law during the prior survey period, see
Barry B. McGough, Elinor H. Hitt & Abigail M. Herrmann, Domestic Relations, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 81 (2018).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-3-60–19-3-66 (2019).
3. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-60(a) (2019).
4. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-3-62–19-3-63 (2019).
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of the parties, and no want of form or technical expression shall
invalidate such agreements.”5
The Georgia Supreme Court faced a question concerning the effect of
a divorce decree on a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in
Cahill v. United States,6 which was certified to Georgia’s high court by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Cathleen M. Cahill and her then-husband Robert A.E. Hall, Jr., owned
real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They
divorced, and their settlement agreement provided that as part of the
division of property, Cahill would have exclusive use and possession of
the property until age sixty-six, at which time it would be placed on the
market for sale. Both parties would remain on the title until sale and
would equally share the net proceeds thereafter.7
The former husband failed to pay federal taxes and the IRS placed a
lien on the jointly-titled property. Subsequently, Cahill turned sixty-six
but passed away before the residence was placed on the market for sale.
Cahill’s estate filed a quiet title action against the United States,
seeking to clear title to its one-half interest in the residence.8 The
district court certified the case to the Georgia Supreme Court to
determine whether the parties’ settlement agreement, as incorporated
into the final judgment and decree, had severed the right of
survivorship from the joint tenancy. 9 The Georgia Supreme Court
interpreted the language in question to be ambiguous, and applied
“well-settled rules of contract construction” to ascertain the intent of
the parties.10 Applying the well-settled rules in the context of the decree
as a whole, the court determined that the parties intended to sever the
right of survivorship along with their marriage. 11 The court did not
directly declare that divorce severs the right of survivorship as a matter
of law, but as a practical matter, parties wishing to retain such a right
in real property through a divorce would do well to clearly state such in
settlement agreements and divorce decrees.12

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

O.C.G.A. § 19-3-62 (2019).
303 Ga. 148, 810 S.E.2d 480 (2018).
Id. at 148, 810 S.E.2d at 481.
Id.
Id. at 149, 810 S.E.2d at 481–82.
Id. at 150–51, 810 S.E.2d at 482.
Id. at 150–51, 810 S.E.2d at 483.
Id. at 152, 810 S.E.2d at 483–84.
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III. ALIMONY
Perhaps the most important legislative action during the survey
period is a matter of federal law. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
(TCJA)13 eliminated the alimony deduction from the Internal Revenue
Code.14 Previously, alimony payments were deductible from the payor’s
income and taxed as income to the recipient under 26 U.S.C. §§ 71 and
215.15 Effective January 1, 2019, however, Internal Revenue Code
sections 71 and 215 were repealed in their entirety.16 As a result,
alimony payments are no longer tax deductible by the paying spouse
and are no longer treated as income taxable to the recipient. 17 The
changes are not retroactive and apply only to divorce decrees or
separation instruments executed after December 31, 2018. 18 If a decree
or instrument establishing an alimony obligation executed prior to
January 1, 2019, is modified after that date, it will be “grandfathered”
in, and the pre-amendment tax treatment will continue to apply unless
the modification expressly provides that the amended rules will take
effect.19
IV. CHILD SUPPORT
The legislature made a series of revisions during the survey period
aimed at clarifying the child support guidelines.20 As amended and
effective July 1, 2018, O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b)(12)21 provides that when a
child is likely to become ineligible for support within two years of the
date of the final order, the court may permit separate worksheets to be
filed for each child showing the adjusted amount to be paid as each
child becomes ineligible.22 The statute now requires that “[a] court’s
final determination of child support shall take into account the obligor’s
earnings, income, and other evidence of the obligor’s ability to pay[,]”
and that “[t]he court or the jury shall also consider the basic subsistence
needs of the parents and the child for whom support is to be provided.” 23
The legislature further clarified the guidelines for determining imputed
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2089 (2017).
Id. § 11051.
26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215 (repealed 2017).
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11051.
26 U.S.C. § 152(d)(5)(A) (2019).
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11051(c)(1).
Id. § 11051(c)(2).
Ga. S. Bill 427, 2018 Ga. Laws 475 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-6-15 (2018)).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b)(12) (2019).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(d) (2019).
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income by adding a non-exhaustive list of fifteen factors courts may
consider in determining how much income to impute. 24 When one
parent is incarcerated, the court is directed not to assume earning
capacity based on pre-incarceration wages or income, but instead to
consider only the income and assets actually available to that parent,25
and not to consider a parent willfully or voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed when that employment status is a result of the parent’s
incarceration.26
The Living Infants Fairness and Equality Act (LIFE Act) 27 was
signed into law during the survey period and is scheduled to go into
effect on January 1, 2020. A full discussion of the LIFE Act is outside
the scope of this Article, but in brief, the Act revises various provisions
of the Official Code of Georgia, Annotated, to include unborn children
within the definition of a “natural person” 28 and to provide further that
unborn children with a “detectable human heartbeat” as defined therein
“shall be included in population based determinations.” 29 In addition to
sweeping revisions to the portions of the Code regulating abortion, the
LIFE Act amends O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(a)(4)(a.1)30 to include unborn
children within the definition of “child” such that unborn children with
a detectable human heartbeat shall be eligible for child support;
additionally, “the maximum amount of support which the court may
impose on the father of an unborn child . . . shall be the amount of
direct medical and pregnancy related expenses of the mother of the
unborn child.”31 After the child is born, the Act provides that “the
provisions of this Code section shall apply in full.” 32 It is unclear at this
time how the courts will approach calculating “direct medical and
pregnancy-related expenses[,]”33 whether revisions will be made to the
Georgia Child Support Calculator, or whether a modification action will
need to be filed upon the child’s birth. Additionally, once the LIFE Act
goes into effect, Georgia will consider an unborn child with a detectable

24. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(4)(A) (2019).
25. Id.
26. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(4)(D) (2019).
27. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, 2019 Ga. Laws 234 (to be codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 1-2-1,
16-12-141, 19-6-15, 19-7-1, 48-7-26, and select provisions of tit. 31).
28. O.C.G.A. § 1-2-1(b) (2019).
29. O.C.G.A. § 1-2-1(d), (e)(1).
30. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 284 § 5 (to be codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 19-6-15(a)(4)(a.1) (2020)).
31. Id. (amending O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(a)(4)(a.1)(2) (2019)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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human heartbeat to qualify as a dependent minor for purposes of
Georgia state income tax calculations.34
V. CUSTODY AND VISITATION
A. Paternity and Legitimation
In Brumbelow v. Mathenia,35 a biological father sought to legitimate
his child after the biological mother voluntarily relinquished her
parental rights on the day following the child’s birth and decided to put
the child up for adoption. During the pregnancy, the mother was
admittedly hostile towards the father and ceased all communication
with him. Accordingly, the father provided no support for the mother
during the pregnancy. The father filed his legitimation petition shortly
after the child’s birth, upon learning that the child had been placed
with a third-party family for adoption.36 The Georgia Court of Appeals
determined that the correct standard when evaluating an unwed
father’s potential abandonment of his opportunity interest is not
whether he could have done more for the child, but whether he “has
done so little as to constitute abandonment.” 37 It follows that a
biological father who has not abandoned his opportunity interest and is
seeking a relationship with his biological child should typically prevail
over strangers who seek to adopt the child.38 Once a biological father is
found to have retained his opportunity interest in a child, the standard
that should be used is the parental fitness standard. 39 If the father is
found to be a fit parent, “he must prevail.”40
In Hill v. Burnett,41 the petitioner wished to legitimate the biological
children of her former same-sex partner, as well as to establish custody
and parenting time.42 The trial court denied both requests, and under
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14,43 awarded the respondent all attorney’s fees
incurred in defending the action. 44 The court of appeals reversed the fee
award for the request for custody and parenting time because the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. § 12(a) (amending O.C.G.A. § 48-7-26(a)).
347 Ga. App. 861, 819 S.E.2d 535 (2018).
Id. at 861–63, 819 S.E.2d at 537–38.
Id. at 868, 819 S.E.2d at 542 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 878, 819 S.E.2d at 547.
Id. at 879, 819 S.E.2d at 547.
Id. at 878, 819 S.E.2d at 547.
349 Ga. App. 260, 825 S.E.2d 617 (2019).
Id. at 260, 825 S.E.2d at 618.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2019).
Hill, 349 Ga. App. at 262, 825 S.E.2d at 619.
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petitioner cited various precedents from other states granting custody
and parenting time to the non-biological parent in a former same-sex
couple.45 Accordingly, the petitioner’s argument fell under the statutory
exception for “a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in
Georgia . . . based on some recognized precedential or persuasive
authority.”46 The merits of the petitioner’s lawsuit were not reviewed by
the court of appeals.47 In contrast, the petitioner’s legitimation claim
wholly lacked merit because, statutorily, “biological father” is defined as
“the male who impregnated the biological mother resulting in the birth
of a child[,]”48 and “only a biological father may bring a legitimation
action.”49 The court of appeals remanded the attorney’s fees issue
regarding custody and parenting time but affirmed the award of
attorney’s fees for the legitimation claim.50
B. Modification
Plummer v. Plummer,51 discussed in 2018’s case update,52 was
reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court during this year’s survey
period.53 The court of appeals previously ruled that in a custody
modification case where the mother and child moved to Florida, and the
father moved to Virginia shortly after filing the petition, Georgia lacked
jurisdiction to modify child custody under O.C.G.A. § 19-9-62(b),54 and
therefore the father’s modification petition filed in Georgia should be
dismissed.55 The supreme court specifically evaluated “whether the
court later lost its jurisdiction to consider the petition to modify custody
after neither the parents nor the child remained in the state.” 56 The
applicable provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),57 O.C.G.A. § 19-9-62, provides:
Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 19-9-64, a court of this
state which has made a child custody determination consistent with
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 263, 265, 825 S.E.2d at 620, 621.
Id. at 262, 825 S.E.2d at 620 (emphasis omitted); O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(c) (2019).
Hill, 349 Ga. App. at 264, 825 S.E.2d at 620.
Id. at 265, 825 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a)(1) (2019)).
Id. (quoting Veal v. Veal, 281 Ga. 128, 129, 636 S.E.2d 527, 529 (2006)).
Id. at 265–66, 825 S.E.2d at 622.
342 Ga. App. 605, 804 S.E.2d 179 (2017).
McGough et al., supra note 1, at 90.
Plummer v. Plummer, 305 Ga. 23, 823 S.E.2d 258 (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-62(b) (2019).
Plummer, 305 Ga. at 24, 823 S.E.2d at 259.
Id. at 25, 823 S.E.2d at 260.
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40–19-9-104 (2019).
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Code Section 19-9-61 or 19-9-63 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
over the determination until . . . (2) A court of this state or a court of
another state determines that neither the child nor the child’s
parents or any person acting as a parent presently resides in this
state.58

The supreme court reviewed precedents from various states, all of
which concluded that “the jurisdictional question is determined as of
the time a child custody modification action is filed.”59 Additionally, the
official comments to the UCCJEA § 202, which is equivalent to O.C.G.A.
§ 19-9-62, state that “[j]urisdiction attaches at the commencement of a
proceeding.”60 The court considered the plain meaning of the statute,
legislative intent, and the context of the statute. 61 Further, the supreme
court cited the general rule that, “in the context of domestic relations
cases . . . jurisdiction, whether subject-matter or personal, is dependent
upon the state of things at the time that an action is filed[,]” 62 and
found the instant case to be no exception.63 In short, jurisdiction
attaches at the time the petition is filed and does not disappear if the
petitioner subsequently moves out of the state.64
C. Grandparent Visitation
Georgia’s beleaguered “grandparent visitation statute” suffered
another setback in Patten v. Ardis,65 in which the Georgia Supreme
Court declared O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d)66 unconstitutional.67 In 1995, the
supreme court held that the Grandparent Visitation Act of 1988 68
violated the constitutional rights of parents “to the extent that it
authorized courts to award child visitation to a grandparent over the
objection of fit parents and without a clear and convincing showing of
harm to the child.”69 The legislature tried again with the Grandparent

58. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-62(a)(2) (2019).
59. Plummer, 305 Ga. at 25, 823 S.E.2d at 260.
60. Id. at 26, 823 S.E.2d at 261.
61. Id. at 27, 823 S.E.2d at 261.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 29, 823 S.E.2d at 263.
64. Id.
65. 304 Ga. 140, 816 S.E.2d 633 (2018).
66. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d) (2019).
67. Patten, 304 Ga. at 145, 816 S.E.2d at 637.
68. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (1988).
69. Patten, 304 Ga. at 140, 816 S.E.2d at 634 (citing Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga.
189, 194, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (1995)).
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Visitation Rights Act of 2012,70 which contains a provision authorizing
the courts to award visitation to grandparents over the objection of a fit
parent and without a finding of harm if, after the death or incarceration
of a parent, the court determines such visitation to be in the best
interests of the child.71
Robert Shaughnessy and Katie Patten married and conceived a child
in 2015, but Shaughnessy passed away before the child was born. After
birth, Patten permitted Shaughnessy’s mother, Mary Jo Ardis, to visit
with the child occasionally, but the relationship soured and Ardis filed a
petition for visitation under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(d). Patten challenged the
constitutionality of the statute and moved to dismiss her
mother-in-law’s petition, but the trial court found it constitutional and
granted visitation under the statutory “best interest” standard. Patten
appealed.72 After an extensive discussion of both Georgia and federal
law emphasizing the fundamental importance of the liberty interest of
parents to rear their children free of state interference, the Georgia
Supreme Court unanimously held the provision in question to be
violative of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 under substantially the
same rationale as in Brooks v. Parkerson,73 decided fourteen years
previously.74 No amendments to the stricken provision are pending in
the legislature at the time of this writing, but any future revisions
would do well to require a finding of harm to the child if such visitation
is denied.
The appellate courts during the survey period were fiercely
protective of parental rights vis-à-vis non-parent visitation. The
Georgia Court of Appeals took another opportunity to discuss the
constitutional deference to parental decision-making in Elmore v.
Clay.75 In Elmore, the child’s stepmother petitioned to adopt the child
and terminate the parental rights of the biological mother, and two
grandparents—one maternal, and one paternal, and incidentally
married to one another—moved to intervene under O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-3(b)(1)(B).76 The trial court terminated the biological mother’s
rights and granted visitation to the intervening grandparents pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c),77 which, in contrast to the provision at issue in

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Ga. H.R. Bill 1198, 2012 Ga. Laws 860 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (2012)).
Id. § 1.
Patten, 304 Ga. at 140–41, 816 S.E.2d at 634.
265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769 (1995).
Patten, 304 Ga. at 145, 816 S.E.2d at 637.
348 Ga. App. 625, 824 S.E.2d 84 (2019).
Id. at 625, 824 S.E.2d at 85; O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(b)(1)(B) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c) (2019).
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Patten, requires the court to find that the child will be harmed if the
visitation is not granted.78 In reviewing the grant of visitation, the court
of appeals cited to the supreme court’s discussion in Patten about the
constitutional considerations when a non-parent seeks visitation over
the wishes of a fit parent. 79 Subsection (c) of the grandparent visitation
statute does not suffer the same constitutional infirmity as the
provision at issue in that case, but ultimately the Georgia Court of
Appeals remanded the order in Elmore with direction for the trial court
to exercise discretion in applying the statutory factors before awarding
grandparent visitation.80
D. Equitable Caregivers
Georgia’s new “equitable caregiver” statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1,81
was passed and signed into law during the survey period and went into
effect on July 1, 2019.82 This new provision authorizes the court to
“adjudicate an individual to be an equitable caregiver.”83 O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-3.1(d)84 provides that a petitioner may establish standing to be
adjudicated an equitable caregiver if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she has:
(1) Fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal,
committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life;
(2) Engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
(3) Established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child,
the relationship was fostered or supported by a parent of the child,
and such individual and the parent have understood, acknowledged,
or accepted or behaved as though such individual is a parent of the
child;
(4) Accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of the
child without expectation of financial compensation; and

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Elmore, 348 Ga. App. at 626–27, 824 S.E.2d at 86.
Id. at 627–28, 824 S.E.2d at 86.
Id. at 629, 824 S.E.2d at 87.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1 (2019).
Ga. H.R. Bill 543, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1).
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(a) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(d) (2019).
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(5) Demonstrated that the child will suffer physical harm or longterm emotional harm and that continuing the relationship between
such individual and the child is in the best interest of the child.85

The court may also grant standing to an individual following consent
from the child’s parent or a written agreement between the petitioner
and the child’s parent indicating “an intention to share or divide
caregiving responsibilities for the child.”86
After finding standing, the court may enter an order establishing
“parental rights and responsibilities . . . including, but not limited to,
custody or visitation.”87 Child support is likely one of the “parental
responsibilities” that may be established, but the statute makes no
explicit mention of the establishment of support obligations from
equitable caregivers to legal parents or from legal parents to equitable
caregivers with custodial rights. The statute does not authorize a
petition for adjudication as an equitable caregiver if the parents are not
separated and the child lives with both parents, 88 and the adjudication
of a person as an equitable caregiver “does not disestablish the
parentage of any other parent.”89
With this bipartisan legislation,90 Georgia joins a growing number of
states across the nation91 that provide avenues for parents and parental
figures in nontraditional situations to establish parental and custodial
rights to children with whom they would otherwise have no formal legal
relationship. Individuals like the plaintiff in Hill v. Burnett,92 discussed
supra, will presumably have recourse that has been denied to them
prior to the enactment of this statute. However, the appellate courts

85. Id. § (d)(1)–(5). This provision specifically incorporates the harm standard
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 544 S.E.2d 99
(2001).
86. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(f) (2019).
87. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(g) (2019).
88. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(h) (2019).
89. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(j) (2019).
90. HB 543 was sponsored by Rep. Chuck Efstration (R-Dacula) and co-sponsored by
Rep. Mary Margaret Oliver (D-Decatur), Rep. Mike Wilensky (D-Dunwoody), and Rep.
Bonnie Rich (R-Suwanee).
91. Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 8-201(c)), Indiana (Ind. Code § 31-9-2-35.5),
South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-60), Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19 § 1891), and
Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46(a)(2)), for example, recognize “de facto” parenthood or
custodianship by statute. A limited number of other states recognize common law
doctrines of equitable or de facto parenthood. See generally In re Custody of B.M.H., 315
P.3d 470 (Wash. 2013); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995); Conover v.
Conover, 146 A.3d 433 (Md. 2016).
92. 349 Ga. App. 260, 825 S.E.2d 617 (2019).
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during the survey period repeatedly emphasized the profound
importance of the constitutional liberty interest of parents to rear their
children free of undue state interference and made clear that they will
apply a high level of scrutiny to statutes and trial court decisions
awarding custody or visitation rights over the objection of fit parents. 93
It seems, therefore, highly likely that contested custody or visitation
awards under this statute will be challenged in the appellate courts
during the 2019–2020 survey period.
VI. EQUITABLE DIVISION
The appellant–husband in Phillips v. Phillips94 was a retired
member of the United States Army. The husband appealed the trial
court’s determination that the wife was entitled to a portion of his
military disability retirement income.95 The Uniformed Services Former
Spouses’ Protection Act96 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of
the United States to mean that “a State may treat as community
property, and divide at divorce, a military veteran’s retirement pay,”
but “exempts from this grant of permission any amount that the
[g]overnment deducts ‘as a result of a waiver’ that the veteran must
make ‘in order to receive’ disability benefits.” 97 Accordingly, when a
spouse “waives . . . all or any portion of his entitlement to his military
retirement pay for any reason[,]” the waived pay—and the disability
benefits acquired as a result of waiver—may not be classified as marital
property.98 It was error for the trial court to classify the husband’s
disability benefits as marital property and to award a portion thereof to
the wife.99
VII. ENFORCEMENT
revisions100

Legislative
to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-77(e)(1)101 requiring that
“[a]ny postjudgment proceeding filed more than 30 days after judgment

93. See, e.g., Borgers v. Borgers, 347 Ga. App. 640, 820 S.E.2d 474 (2018); Patten v.
Ardis, 304 Ga. 140, 816 S.E.2d 633 (2018).
94. 347 Ga. App. 524, 820 S.E.2d 158 (2018).
95. Id. at 528, 820 S.E.2d at 162.
96. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2019).
97. Phillips, 347 Ga. App. at 528, 820 S.E.2d at 162 (quoting Howell v. Howell, 137 S.
Ct. 1400, 1402 (2017)).
98. Id. at 530, 820 S.E.2d at 163.
99. Id.
100. Ga. H.R. Bill 239, 2019 Ga. Laws 271, § 6-3 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-6-77(e)(1)
(2019)).
101. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-77(e)(1) (2019).
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or dismissal in an action shall be considered as a new case for the
purposes of this Code section and shall be given a new case number by
the clerk of the superior court”102 went into effect on May 7, 2019. 103
This provision applies to “all actions, cases, proceedings, motions, or
filings civil in nature, including but not limited to actions for divorce,
domestic relations actions, modifications on closed civil cases, [and]
adoptions . . . .”104
In Johnson v. Johnson,105 the parties were divorced in 2013. In 2015,
the wife filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the husband was in
contempt of the divorce decree by not exercising his allotted parenting
time and not financially supporting the parties’ shared child with Down
syndrome.106 The parenting plan provided that “[t]he Husband shall be
entitled to parenting time with [the child] on alternating weekends . . . .
The Husband shall be entitled to parenting time with [the child] on
each Wednesday (or other mutually convenient weekday) afternoon for
dinner.”107
Because the plain language of the parenting plan did not require that
the husband spend parenting time with the child but merely “entitled”
him to the time, the trial court erred when it found the husband in
contempt of this provision.108 Accordingly, any parenting plan using the
language “entitled to” does not compel the visiting parent to spend the
designated time with the child and the parent cannot be found in
contempt for failing to do so.109 The wife’s request for a “frivolous appeal
penalty” was therefore dismissed by the court. 110
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order in
Borgers v. Borgers,111 a post-divorce contempt proceeding, requiring the
mother to enroll the parties’ youngest child in private school. 112 The
divorce decree awarded the parties joint legal custody of the three
minor children and delegated primary physical custody and final
decision-making authority to the mother, including educational
decision-making.113 Unusually, the trial court explicitly “expressed
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
349 Ga. App. 99, 825 S.E.2d 487 (2019).
Id. at 99, 825 S.E.2d at 488.
Id. at 99–100, 825 S.E.2d at 489.
Id. at 100, 825 S.E.2d at 489.
Id.
Id. at 101, 825 S.E.2d at 489–90.
347 Ga. App. 640, 820 S.E.2d 474.
Id. at 640, 820 S.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 641, 820 S.E.2d at 475.
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concern as to whether home-schooling [was] in the best interests of [the]
children” in the divorce decree itself, but made no provision preventing
the mother from doing so.114 Subsequently, the father filed a series of
contempt motions alleging, inter alia, violations of the parenting plan
and visitation schedule and alienation of the children, and requesting a
modification of his child support obligation. The father also referenced
the divorce court’s disapproval of the mother’s home-schooling the
children but did not explicitly request a modification of custody.
Following a temporary hearing on child support, the father filed
another contempt petition, once more alleging violations of the
parenting plan; again, the father did not request a modification of
custody. Another hearing was held, and the court issued a final order
purporting to resolve both contempt petitions.115 Therein, the court
opined that it was “a shame” that the mother had not “taught her
children to be independent” and found that the children struggled in
school as a result of home-schooling, but expressly stated that custody
would not be changed because a modification had not been requested.116
Then, following a status and compliance hearing approximately two
months later, the trial court entered a compliance order which found
that the parties had complied with its previous order but nevertheless
ordered the mother to enroll the youngest child, who was home-schooled
at the time, at a local Montessori School.117
The mother appealed the compliance order on the basis that it
constituted an improper modification of custody during a contempt
proceeding; while trial courts may interpret and clarify the meaning of
a divorce decree, the court in a contempt proceeding may not modify a
final judgment and decree.118 The court of appeals first analyzed
whether the compliance order, requiring the parent with final
decision-making on educational issues to enroll the child in a school
against that parent’s own wishes, constituted a modification of
custody.119 The court of appeals did not identify any cases directly
stating such, but a survey of similar cases involving parental
decision-making led the court to conclude that it did. 120 “Whether the
trial court effectively granted the father the right to make decisions

114. Id. at 641, 820 S.E.2d at 475–76.
115. Id. at 641, 820 S.E.2d at 476.
116. Id. at 642, 820 S.E.2d at 476.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 642, 820 S.E.2d at 477 (quoting McCall v. McCall, 246 Ga. App. 770, 772,
542 S.E.2d 168, 170 (2000)).
119. Id. at 643, 820 S.E.2d at 477.
120. Id. at 643–44, 820 S.E.2d at 477–78.
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regarding the child’s education or took it upon itself to make this
particular decision, the result is the same: the final decision-maker . . .
lost her right to make the final decision about the youngest child’s
education.”121 Having determined that the compliance order modified
the mother’s custodial rights, and that no valid custody modification
was ever initiated by either party, the court of appeals reversed the
order.122 Chief Judge Dillard concurred specially to emphasize that,
while the trial court’s order was reversed because the court lacked
authority to modify custody in a contempt action, the trial court’s
substitution of its own judgment for that of the mother represented a
potential violation of her parental rights under both the federal and
Georgia Constitutions.123 Judge Dillard cautioned trial courts to be
mindful of the fundamental liberty interest of parents to rear their
children free of state interference, and affirmed that the higher courts
“will not hesitate to remind our trial courts of the solemn obligation
they have to safeguard the parental rights of all Georgians.” 124
The availability of jury trials in contempt proceedings was the
primary issue on appeal in Bernard v. Bernard.125 Following the parties’
divorce, the former wife filed a series of contempt motions against the
former husband for repeated failures to pay his alimony and child
support obligations. Following a March 1, 2017 hearing, the former
husband was ordered immediately incarcerated until he paid $20,000 to
purge himself. He did so and was released. The following August, the
former wife initiated another contempt proceeding, alleging yet again
that the former husband’s support obligations were in arrears. In his
answer, the former husband requested a jury trial and moved to set
aside one of the prior contempt judgments. After a hearing, the trial
court denied both requests, found that the former husband had willfully
failed or refused to pay an arrearage of $107,056.76, and ordered him
incarcerated until he purged himself by paying the full amount. The
former husband then filed a motion for supersedeas and was released
on the condition that he obtain a supersedeas bond. He failed to acquire
the bond and instead initiated an appeal. While the discretionary
appeal was pending, the trial court revoked his supersedeas and
ordered him incarcerated again until he purged himself or posted bond.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 644, 820 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 645, 820 S.E.2d at 478.
Id. at 645–46, 820 S.E.2d at 478–79 (Dillard, C.J., concurring fully and specially).
Id. at 650–51, 820 S.E.2d at 482 (Dillard, C.J., concurring fully and specially).
347 Ga. App. 429, 819 S.E.2d 688 (2018).
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The former husband then filed a second application for discretionary
review, which was consolidated with the first. 126
On appeal, the former husband claimed that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a jury trial under O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4(b),127 which
provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for
contempt for failing or refusing to pay over money under any order,
decree, or judgment . . . when he denies that the money ordered or
decreed to be paid over is in his power, custody, or control until he has a
trial by jury.”128 The court of appeals concluded that despite the
straightforward-seeming language of the statute, decades of binding
Georgia Supreme Court precedent holds that jury trials are simply not
available as a matter of right in civil contempt proceedings arising from
failure to pay alimony.129 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying the former husband’s request. 130 The supreme court denied
certiorari on May 20, 2019.131
VIII. ATTORNEY’S FEES
Reid132

Reid v.
addressed attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2133
and O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 awarded subsequent to the “lengthy and
contentious litigation” of a divorce case.134 The purpose of attorney’s
fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 is to ensure both parties are adequately
represented.135 The statute does not require a finding of reasonableness
of the fees but only requires that the court consider the relative
financial circumstances of the parties.136
“An award under [O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14] must be supported by
‘sufficient proof of the actual costs and the reasonableness of those
costs.’”137 The amount of attorney’s fees awarded under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-15-14 must be attributed to the sanctionable conduct and limited to

126. Id. at 429–31, 819 S.E.2d at 689–91.
127. O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4 (2019).
128. Bernard, 347 Ga. App. at 433, 819 S.E.2d at 692 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4(b)
(2019)).
129. Id. at 433–34 nn.13–16, 819 S.E.2d at 692–93 nn.13–16.
130. Id. at 436, 819 S.E.2d at 694.
131. Bernard, 347 Ga. App. 429, 819 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied (May 20, 2019).
132. 348 Ga. App. 550, 823 S.E.2d 860 (2019).
133. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 (2019).
134. Reid, 348 Ga. App. at 550, 823 S.E.2d at 862.
135. Id. at 552, 823 S.E.2d at 864.
136. Id. at 553, 823 S.E.2d at 864.
137. Id. at 553, 823 S.E.2d at 865 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Rogers, 341
Ga. App. 146, 152, 798 S.E.2d 701, 706 (2017)).
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the amount incurred as a result of said sanctionable conduct. 138
Evidence presented in support of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 must specifically
show exactly which fees were caused by the conduct 139 and how the
court reached the exact dollar amount awarded “as opposed to any other
[dollar] amount.”140 When a trial court fails to apportion the fees
properly, the correct course of action is to “vacate the fee award and
remand for further proceedings.”141
Also, of note, the court of appeals held that evidence of settlement
offers exchanged throughout the litigation may be admissible for
purposes of the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded to the wife, by
ascertaining if the husband’s conduct “constituted delay or abuse of
process.”142
In Ford v. Ford,143 the trial court awarded the wife attorney’s fees
under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, and the husband appealed.144 The parties’
settlement agreement contained a provision stating:
Neither party shall pay any alimony to the other. Each party does
forever waive all rights to receive any alimony from the other party,
including periodic, lump-sum, alimony in-kind, or any other claims of
any nature whatsoever each may have against the other for any
payment in the nature of alimony under existing or future laws or
status of the State of Georgia or any other state or country in which
the parties may be residing. Each accepts this Agreement as
settlement of all past, present, and future claims of modification of
alimony as provided by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 (a), (b), (c), (d), and any
amendments thereto, and any and all future laws regarding
modification of alimony as may be enacted in this or any other
state . . . .145

The agreement namely referenced the seminal case of Varn v.
Varn.146 The parties also agreed to have the assigned judge determine
the issue of attorney’s fees through letter briefs subsequently submitted
by the parties. The wife filed her letter brief asking for attorney’s fees,
and the husband replied stating that she was not entitled to said fees

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 554, 823 S.E.2d at 865.
Id.
Id. at 555, 823 S.E.2d at 866.
Id.
Id. at 556, 823 S.E.2d at 866.
349 Ga. App. 45, 825 S.E.2d 449 (2019).
Id. at 45, 825 S.E.2d at 450.
Id. at 45–46, 825 S.E.2d at 451.
242 Ga. 309, 248 S.E.2d 667 (1978).
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but did not allude to the alimony waiver provision.147 However, the
court of appeals allowed the husband to assert the waiver argument
first advanced in his motion for reconsideration, relying on the principal
that, “[w]here the party obtains the judgment without meeting the
burden of proof, the opposing party may challenge the judgment on that
ground, and in doing so may assert arguments not made to the trial
court.”148 Accordingly, the husband could assert that the wife did not
“meet her burden of showing her entitlement to the award of attorney
fees” because the trial court had determined that the wife met this
burden simply by awarding fees.149
In an enumeration of errors, an appellant is “only required to set
forth the legal ruling that he is challenging[,]” not definite
arguments.150 The husband’s argument that the terms of the settlement
agreement prohibited the award of attorney’s fees was not a legal ruling
required in his enumeration of errors.151 The court then analyzed
whether the alimony provision of the parties’ settlement agreement
prevented the wife from recovering attorney’s fees.152 “Attorney fees
awarded to a spouse pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 . . . are considered to
be part of alimony[,]”153 and the court of appeals ultimately determined
that the alimony waiver precluded an award of attorney’s fees to the
wife under that Code section.154 The court of appeals declined to review
extrinsic evidence in making that determination, but rather relied on
ordinary rules of contract construction and the text of the agreement;
extrinsic evidence may only be used to decipher an agreement where
the “text is so ambiguous that its meaning cannot be determined
through application of the ordinary rules of textual construction.” 155
In Boley v. Miera,156 the father sought a reduction in child support,
and the mother counterclaimed for an increase. The father was granted
a reduction and the mother was awarded attorney’s fees. The father

147. Ford, 349 Ga. App. at 46, 825 S.E.2d at 451.
148. Id. at 47, 825 S.E.2d at 452.
149. Id. at 48, 825 S.E.2d at 452.
150. Id. at 48, 825 S.E.2d at 453 (citing Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 539, 523 S.E.2d 1,
6 (1999)).
151. Id. at 49, 825 S.E.2d at 453.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Vakharwala v. Vakharwala, 301 Ga. 251, 254, 799 S.E.2d 797, 800
(2017)) (punctuation omitted).
154. Id. at 48, 825 S.E.2d at 453.
155. Id. at 51, 825 S.E.2d at 454 (quoting Atlanta Dev. Auth. v. Clark Atlanta Univ.,
298 Ga. 575, 581, 784 S.E.2d 353, 358 (2016)).
156. 347 Ga. App. 161, 817 S.E.2d 823 (2018).
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appealed the attorney’s fees award.157 The plain language of O.C.G.A.
§ 19-6-15(k)(5),158 under which the award was granted, states that the
party awarded fees must be the prevailing party. 159 The father was the
prevailing party since he obtained a reduction in child support, and
therefore the trial court erred when it granted the mother attorney’s
fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(5).160
In Bishop v. Goins,161 the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the court
of appeals’ decision162 regarding attorney’s fees awards for appeals of
stalking-related protective orders.163 The court clarified that an
attorney’s fees award typically must be specifically authorized by
statute.164 A plain reading of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-94(d)165 illustrates that
fees must be related to the “order or agreement” entered in the stalking
protective order action and therefore may not be granted during
appellate proceedings.166 The court of appeals’ decision to approve such
an award was reversed.167
In Chalk v. Poletto,168 the father filed a petition to legitimate his two
biological children. The trial court denied the petition and awarded the
mother’s motion for directed verdict for attorney’s fees, litigation costs,
and guardian ad litem fees.169 The father appealed, and the court of
appeals affirmed.170 The mother and father had two children together
and lived together until the children were roughly two and four years
old. The mother evicted the father, and the father filed for
legitimation.171 The court found compelling the facts that the father
could not articulate the amount of support he claimed to have given the
children, had no documentary evidence reflecting the purported
support, and had previously pled guilty to “the felony of making false
statements to receive benefits.”172 Moreover, the father declared no
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 161, 824 S.E.2d at 824.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(k)(5) (2019).
Boley, 347 Ga. App. at 161, 817 S.E.2d at 824.
Id. at 162, 817 S.E.2d at 824.
305 Ga. 310, 824 S.E.2d 369 (2019).
Bishop v. Goins, 344 Ga. App. 174, 809 S.E.2d 280 (2017).
Bishop, 305 Ga. at 310, 824 S.E.2d at 369–70.
Id. at 311, 824 S.E.2d at 370.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-94(d) (2019).
Bishop, 305 Ga. at 312, 824 S.E.2d at 371.
Id.
346 Ga. App. 491, 816 S.E.2d 432 (2018).
Id. at 491, 816 S.E.2d at 434.
Id.
Id. at 491–92, 816 S.E.2d at 434.
Id. at 492, 816 S.E.2d at 434.
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assets, but had taken multiple extensive international trips, and “had
paid for indoor skydiving, laser hair removal, college classes, and
renewal of his private pilot’s license.” 173 He also did not attempt to
legitimate the children until they were ages two and four and
previously consented to a protective order which forbid communication
with the children.174 Therefore, the court held that the father had
abandoned his opportunity interest and denied his petition to
legitimate.175
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g)176 authorizes the court to use “wide
discretion . . . to award reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in child
custody actions.”177 Even though custody was not addressed because the
petition for legitimation was denied, the trial court was authorized to
grant the mother an attorney’s fees award under O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g)
because the father prayed for joint legal custody and parenting time. 178
The trial court could have granted the father parenting time and
custody under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(g)179 and, therefore, was entitled to
grant attorney’s fees and expenses to the mother under O.C.G.A.
§ 19-9-3(g).180
IX. APPELLATE PRACTICE
Ford,181

In Ford v.
the court of appeals affirmed and clarified the
sometimes-challenging rules of appellate domestic relations practice. 182
There, the parties were divorced and the father filed a direct appeal
challenging only the award of custody of the parties’ minor children to
the mother.183 The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction;184 while the direct appeal procedures set forth in O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-34185 do allow for direct appeal of “[a]ll judgments or orders in
child custody cases[,]”186 that provision is limited to cases exclusively

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 492–93, 816 S.E.2d at 434–35.
Id. at 495, 816 S.E.2d at 436.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g) (2019).
Chalk, 346 Ga. App. at 496, 816 S.E.2d at 436.
Id. at 496, 816 S.E.2d at 436–37.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(g) (2019).
Chalk, 346 Ga. App. at 496, 816 S.E.2d at 437.
347 Ga. App. 233, 818 S.E.2d 690 (2018).
Id. at 233, 818 S.E.2d at 691.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11) (2019).
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concerning child custody.187 When the custody determination under
appeal is ancillary to a divorce action—even if custody is the only issue
raised on appeal—the discretionary appeal procedures of O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(a)(2)188 must be followed.189 Failure to do so will prevent the
reviewing court from acquiring jurisdiction and result in the dismissal
of the appeal.190
X. CONCLUSION
The 2018–2019 survey period saw relatively few developments to the
common law in the areas of equitable division, alimony, and child
support, but the appellate courts offered significant guidance regarding
custody and visitation rights, post judgment enforcement, and the rules
governing attorney’s fees awards. Legislative action during the survey
period was dramatic, and among others the LIFE Act and equitable
caregiver statute each represent major alterations to longstanding
principles of Georgia law, which may generate appellate litigation in
the coming years.

187.
188.
189.
190.

Ford, 347 Ga. App. at 234, 818 S.E.2d at 691.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2) (2019).
Ford, 347 Ga. App. at 234, 818 S.E.2d at 691.
Id.

